An optimal control model is used to determine the socially optimal spatial and temporal allocation of groundwater and surface water among agricultural and urban uses. The control model is described briefly and its advantages over other dynamic models are enumerated. Optimal rates of groundwater pumpage over the planning horizon were highly sensitive to increasing energy costs. Groundwater basins are shown to react differently to alternative economic and hydrological parameters. In a dynamic setting, a policy of pump taxes was shown empirically to be superior to pro-rata quotas and uncontrolled pumpage.
The severe drought in the western United States in 1976-78 brought the problems of allocating extremely limited water resources to the attention of agriculturalists and urbanites alike. Greatly reduced surface water supplies exacerbated the already critical pressure on remaining groundwater stocks in the same areas.
The chronic overdraft of many western states groundwater basins can be attributed directly to their common pool nature. The lack of explicit property rights to groundwater stocks results in individual users of the resource evaluating only their own private pumping costs in their decision framework and implicitly assigning a zero opportunity cost to the stock portion of the resource. Thus, the private decision does not take into account any user cost and results in a divergence in the private and the social optimal rate of pumping. 1 The objective of this paper is to describe briefly an optimal control model which can be used to determine the socially optimal spatial and temporal allocation of groundwater and surface water among agricultural and urban uses. The control model is then applied to a representative region of California under several sets of energy costs. Two policies, prorata allocation and taxation, are evaluated empirically as alternatives for accounting for externalities due to the common pool problem.
The Conceptual Framework
Several authors have investigated the conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water using various techniques. Buras developed a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the problem of conjunctive use of reservoirs and aquifers. His operating policy, however, considered the physical system as a single unit and thus ignored differences in hydrology that occur in a complex groundwater system. Burt (1964 Burt ( , 1966 Burt ( , 1967a , b) utilized a mathematical programming approach to develop a demand function for irrigation water used in a dynamic programming formulation of the aquifer management problem. Bredehoeft and Young used a simulation model to estimate the solution of problems involving the development of a stream-aquifer system in an economic model of irrigation. Bear and Levin studied optimal utilization of an aquifer as one element of a gramming, which limits the number of state and control variables. Finally, the use of the LQCM allows direct calculation of the user cost of groundwater. Both Kelso and Renshaw discuss the importance of including stock values in determining optimal water allocation. By using the LQCM, it is possible to maximize the value of both the stock and current value components of the water resource simultaneously, thereby allowing the calculation of the socially optimal spatial and temporal allocation.
Application of the Conceptual Framework
The geographical setting, Yolo County, located in the southwest corner of the Sacramento Valley, was selected for several reasons. It provides an example of a region in which conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water has evolved without any particular centralized planning (California Department of Water Resources). Several water agencies have areas of jurisdiction within the county and most if not all of each agency's planning is independent of the others with decisions being made to maximize private rather than overall social value of the water.
The county has a highly variable supply of surface water from Clear Lake, Indian Valley Reservoir, and the Sacramento River-Colusa Drain complex, used almost exclusively for irrigation. Groundwater supplies a more costly but more dependable source of water to both agricultural and urban users. The aquifer was partitioned into six basins for modeling purposes and follows the work done by hydrologists Scott and Scalmanini. The partitioning permitted the model to allocate water spatially and took account of unequal pumping lifts throughout the aquifer. There was also the problem of unequal specific yields throughout the aquifer, and the division of the aquifer into several basins permitted specification of storage capacities reflecting yields. The division of the aquifer required that the subsurface inflows and outflows between the six basins be accounted for in the model. Burt (1974) The welfare function is subject to two sets of constraints. The first set [equation (2)] is the equations of motion or first-order difference equations describing the physical system. This is a reduced-form system, which in this study is a linear approximation to a complex physical system. A, B, and C are specified as time invariant matrices and d is a vector of constants. The second set of constraints [equations (3), (4), and (5)] respresents the physical, institutional, and nonnegativity conditions on the stocks and flows of water. These constraints are not applied to every scenario posed by the model but rather act as individual scenario conditions so that resulting allocation patterns and effects on social welfare can be observed.
The Results
One reason for using an optimal control model was that it allowed direct calculation and interpretation of the user costs associated with temporal allocations. Table 2 contains the optimal spatial and temporal allocation of groundwater and surface water suggested by the model under a 4.5g electrical power cost scenario. Several observations can be made about these results. The amount of groundwater used for agricultural production generally increases over time. Several economic factors determine the temporal allocation of water in the model. Factors which limit the quantity allocated to a specific period are (a) increased pumping costs for the remainder of the planning horizon for those basins having declining water tables and (b) lower marginal values from additional quantities of water used in that time period. The factors tending to increase the quantity used per period are (a) time preference reflected by the discount rate and (b) high net marginal values on low rates of water usage. The wide range of agricultural groundwater pumpages (0.0 to 141,690 acre-feet in 1980) illustrates quite dramatically the variability in optimal groundwater allocations that can exist in a single aquifer when both the economic and physical parameters in each basin are considered in the decision-making process. Table 2 also contains urban groundwater allocations which are based on "need" projections. The projections are based on urban water requirement studies done by several engineering consulting firms, and by using an urban water projection model developed by Savage and Helweg for estimating the impact of population and areal growth patterns for water use rates for the City of Davis. The projections were used as constraints on urban allocations because early control model runs, based on the hypothetical urban demand functions estimated for this study, allocated certain amounts to the urban areas in excess of existing or projected distribution system capacity.
The amount of groundwater needed by urban users moves from 6.8% of the total amount of groundwater used in all basins in 1977 to 8.6% of the total by 2,005. This represents a small proportion of the total amount of groundwater used in any period. Thus, the impacts on groundwater stocks by urban usage is rather insignificant for any basin as a whole. This suggests that concern that urban growth will affect adversely agricultural pumpage and pumping cost is largely unfounded.
The surface water allocations shown in table 2 can be explained by the surface water cost used in this model: namely, those that existed in 1977 were selected due to the difficulty in predicting the future price-setting actions of the various agencies allocating surface water. Because surface water costs are substantially less than groundwater pumping costs, surface water allocations depend on the relative net marginal values of this water between the various basins and on the capacity of the distribution system. Surface water allocations are limited in every power cost scenario by constraints associated with either reservoir water distribution capacity or the amount of surface water that can be obtained from the Sacramento River-Colusa Drain complex. The surface water allocations listed in table 2 are thus constrained allocations. In this section two policies are analyzed empirically that could be utilized to achieve a more socially preferred allocation of groundwater. The focus here is on groundwater because of the lack of any definitive empirical studies which evaluate the impact of various policies on the social value of groundwater. This is not meant to infer that surface water allocation is unimportant. Quite to the contrary, surface water sources supply almost one-half the county's agricultural water demands.
The control model provided the socially efficient allocations of the surface water resource. If contractual arrangements were made on a "market value" rather than a "first come-first serve" arrangement, then surface water would move toward a more socially efficient allocation. For example, if agricultural producers were allowed to bid for available water supplies, assured full property rights and perfect competition, they would bid the price up to the level of the marginal value of water utilized in production. Because the control model is based on exactly this type of allocation procedure, it is expected that surface allocation resulting from the "water market" arrangement would approximate the socially optimum allocation indicated by the control model. The pro-rata groundwater policy. The prorata method is one that attacks the common pool problem by adjudicating annual groundwater quotas to overlying landowners. The quota most often recommended is established by restricting pumpage to the long-run mean recharge rate. This suggests that no mining of the resource should be permitted on the average. Table 5 provides a comparison of the total value of the groundwater resource for the entire Yolo County aquifer under socially optimum conditions (no restrictions on temporal allocations of the resource in any basin) as opposed to a quota system, where the quota is limited to the mean recharge rate. This comparison is made under two energy cost scenarios and the results under both energy cost runs indicate that using a quota diminishes the potential social benefits to be derived from the resource. The 4.5g energy cost scenario shows a much wider divergence from the optimal social value, however, than does the 6.5o energy cost scenario. The percentage loss of social value under the 4.50 energy scenario ranges from 11% to 6% over the planning horizon, while for the 6.5e energy scenario the range is only 4.4% to 1.1%. As energy costs increase and the optimal amount of water to be used in any single period declines, the quota system comes closer to approximating the social value of the resource on a basin-wide basis.
From the above it is obvious that quotas will be least inefficient where the amount of water mining in the optimal allocation is small in relation to recharge. However, quotas always will be suboptimal if any economic mining of the resource is optimal, and their inefficiency will increase as transaction costs are taken into consideration. These costs would be in the form of administrating and policing the quota policy. The quota values listed in table 5 include none of these costs, and thus must be viewed as upper bounds and the differences are biased downwards. It should be noted here that this situation is not unique for quota policies. Any policy which controls the use of a common property resource in a more socially preferred manner probably would require a new institutional structure and therefore would require new transaction costs.
Laissez-faire groundwater policy. The inclusion of transaction costs in the calculus of considering policy changes creates the possibility that the status quo may offer the "best" that can be done in terms of maximizing the social value of the water resource. Table 6 compares the value of the groundwater of Yolo County under a purely private decision-making situation where each pumper decides independently how much water to take from the aquifer and the socially efficient situation where the negative externalities associated with private actions are taken into consideration. The user cost or stock value is assigned a zero value to represent the private allocation situation.
There is a large difference between the so- cial optimum and the private optimum value of the water resource, much larger than the difference between the social optimum and the quota solution described above. These differences, however, are not directly comparable because they measure different things. The difference between the quota and the socially optimum value represents the returns foregone if the amount of groundwater usage is limited to a long-run mean recharge quota. The unrestricted pumping value is a measure of the external cost imposed on all water users by the failure of individual pumpers to take into account the total social costs of individual pumping. The total difference between the social optimum and the private solution is $52,918,000 over the thirty-year-planning horizon. In comparing the unrestricted solution to the quota policy solution, it must be concluded that neither policy is efficient. However, the quota policy appears better to approximate the social optimum than does the unrestricted pumping policy. Thus, a policy to control groundwater use appears to be justified if the transaction costs are less than the costs of the externalities. Thus, even though it has been shown that the long-run recharge quota is not a "good" policy for reaching the true social value of the water resource, it can be used to control allocations so that the negative externalities are taken into consideration. It appears, therefore, that a good case can be made for limiting the water pumped from the aquifer, unless there are opportunities for economically efficient transfers among basins on the surface through a market transfer process. If so, continued overdrafting would be justified only if the value of the transferred water at the margin were higher than the sum of the user costs, pumping costs, and transfer costs.
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Pumping tax policy. An alternative policy for managing a groundwater basin that suffers from the problem of commonality of use is to levy a tax on pumping. This is a widely proposed solution to correct a divergence between private and social costs (Pigou) . In this case the marginal private cost is simply the marginal cost of pumping to individual users. The marginal social cost includes as well the loss of productivity to individual users because of competitive pumping. The dominant problem with Pigovian solutions is the selection of the correct tax (Baumol). Milliman demonstrates that if the marginal value of a unit of water pumped is equated to the marginal social cost of pumping the water that a social optimum has been reached.
The necessary condition for the empirical model to allocate water optimally requires that the net marginal value of a unit of water used be equated to the transformed user cost. Because the marginal private pumping costs already have been subtracted from the marginal values, the transformed user cost actually measures the difference between the marginal social and marginal private cost of pumping a unit of water. As such, it represents the optimal marginal tax rate that is required to force private and social costs to converge. Table 7 contains the optimal tax under a 4.5o energy cost scenario. The results listed in the table indicate that the optimal tax structure is not a fixed levy over the entire planning horizon, but is rather a declining set of tax rates. The table results raise other issues. First, all tax rates are positive. At first glance this may appear somewhat surprising given that three of the six basins indicate rising water tables after the 4.50 energy cost has been reached. Even with rising water tables, however, if an individual pumper did not extract a unit of water, the water table would rise somewhat higher than if the unit of water were extracted. This extraction thus increases the pumping costs of the other individuals using the aquifer.
In addition, the tax rates show a wide range From an analytical viewpoint the two methods of dealing with commonality of water use offer very different lines of attack. Quota setting in effect imposes a tighter constraint on the resource than does taxation. Quota setting transfers the decision making from the private user to a central agency. Taxation allows greater flexibility because the decision on pumpage is left to the individual user. The tax simply becomes another component of the pumper's cost function and is taken into consideration when deciding how much water should be used in any time period. Baumol demonstrates that where an externality (technical) exists that taxes upon the generator of the externality are all that is required to produce an efficient allocation. Baumol argues that even if the level of taxation needs to be adjusted in a tatonnement process to achieve the desired result, it is still the best way to correct the divergence between social and private cost.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a control model framework for determining the optimal spatial and temporal allocation of water in a complex hydrologic and economic setting. The advantage of this framework over past work done in the area of water resource allocation is the ability of the model to handle a large degree of disaggregation and to provide valuable economic and hydrologic information about the physical system with respect to its common pool nature. Thus, this paper demonstrates the usefulness of a framework that can take the interaction of several groundwater basins into consideration as the socially optimum allocations are determined& Two broad policy implications can be drawn from the results.
First, the areal size of a water resourceplanning unit must be chosen with care. The results presented in this paper illustrate quite dramatically that the six basins making up the Yolo County aquifer react differently to alternative economic and hydrologic parameters. In terms of policy, this means that designation of groundwater planning units should be based on economic and hydrologic parameters and not on political or geographical boundaries. The degree of hydrologic interdependence between different basins in the same aquifer, or between aquifers, is the key factor in determining any planning unit. These interdependencies are directly related to the common pool problem associated with groundwater use. If the interdependencies are not accounted for in the allocation decision, there will be a large reduction in the social value of the groundwater resource.
The second policy implication relates to the economic impacts associated with policy alternatives for moving current groundwater allocations to a more socially preferred set. Although taxation and pro-rata allocations have been suggested a number of times in the literature as institutional instruments to achieve a more socially optimal allocation of resources, the current framework has shown the change in social value of the resource that can be expected upon their implementation. The results indicate that both instruments will increase the social value of the groundwater resource but that if any mining of the resource is contemplated, that taxation provides for the greatest social value of the groundwater being achieved.
[Received June 1979; revision accepted December 1979.]
